SUBJECT: Combat Operation After Action Report (RCS: MACV J3-32)
THRU: Commanding General
25th Infantry Division
ATTN: AVTLGC-MH
APO US Forces 96225
TO: Commander
US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
ATTN: J343
APO US Forces 96243
1. Operation FARGO: 1st Brigade Search and Destroy Operation to locate and
destroy VC forces, supplies and base camps.
2. Dates of Operation: 120420 - 141515 June 1966.
3. Location: Area of operations was in the vicinity of PHUOC
HIEP-AP BAU DIEU Villages bounded by coordinates XT555195 North; XT570175 East; XT550153
South; XT540172 West.
4. Control Headquarters: 1st Brigade, 25th Infantry Division.
5. Reporting Officer: Colonel William B. Sandlin, Jr.
6. Task Organization and Commanders:
a. 2d Bn, 14th Inf (-) Lt Col Shultz, Cmdg.
3d Plat, Troop B, 3/4 Cav
Engr Sqd, 65th Engr Bn
VN National Police
b. 4th Bn, 9th Inf, Lt Col Booth, Cmdg.
2d Plat, Troop B, 3/4 Cav
Engr Sqd, A Co, 65th Engr Bn
MP Sqd, 25th MP Co
7. Support Forces:
a. Artillery: 7th Bn, 11th Arty was employed in Direct Support of
the 1st Brigade.
(1) How and when employed.
(a) 7th Bn, 11th Arty (-)
supported from base camp Cu Chi
(b) B Btry supported from
2d Bn, 14th Inf base camp area XT556168.
(c) Fire was used
primarily as H&I fire. 56 H&I missions were fired totaling 224 rounds.
18 support missions were fired totaling 108 rounds.
(2) Results: H&I fires denied VC freedom of
movement during hours of darkness.
b. Tactical Air: No suitable air targets were determined during this
operation.
c. Army Aviation: Forty (40) UH-1D and sixteen (16) UH-1B to lift an
Infantry battalion and one Infantry company simultaneously into three landing zones.
During the operational period, 368 sorties were flown which consisted of airmobile
assault, command and control, aerial reconnaissance, aerial resupply and medical
evacuation.
8. Intelligence:
a. Intelligence studies conducted prior to operation FARGO indicated
VC activity within the operational area has been generally concentrated along Hwy 1 and
Hwy 7. Since 1 May, both routes have been the scene of numerous mine incidents.
Anti-aircraft incidents in the area have increased in the past month. The C50
Company was reported in the vic XT506171. Reports indicate the C50's mission is to
stage attacks along Hwy 1, to collect taxes and capture GVN employees. The C50
Company is reportedly armed with 1-60mm mortar, 1-lmg, 4-ARs, 2-M79s and assorted small
arms. The C26 Company, strength 100, was reported in the vic XT569168 on 18 May.
This is the 2d report of this company in the same area. The company
reportedly possesses 1-60mm mortar, 1-.30 cal MG, 5-ARs, 4 grenade launchers and assorted
small arms. Due to the large number of mine incidents, it is concluded that VC
sapper units are also present and operating with local force guerrilla units. The
actual mission and organization of these sapper elements is unknown, however these squads
have the mission of mining and interdicting Hwy 1 and 7. The operational area is
known to contain numerous guerrilla squads operate consistently vic PHUOC HIEP (XT569170).
b. Recent significant activities revealed that on 1 Jun 3 National
Police vehicles traveling from Cu Chi to Trang Bang were ambushed by a VC squad with AW's
at XT554169. One vehicle was destroyed, 6 ARVN's KIA, 1 WIA, and 20,000 piastres
(payroll) stolen. On 3 June, elements from Trung Lap Ranger Training Center were
ambushed at XT593210 by 20 to 40 VC.
c. During the operation VC contact was limited to occasional sniper
fire. The VC employed booby traps within the AO and a road block along Hwy 1.
Number of VC guerillas operating in AO could not be confirmed.
d. The terrain in the area of operations consisted of thick hedge
rows, some heavy brush and wooded areas which offered excellent concealment and cover from
direct fire weapons. There are also many clearings and rice fields which offered the
VC excellent fields of fire. There were no major obstacles which could affect the
movement of track vehicles and dismounted troops. The weather had no effect on the
conduct of the operations. The only natural obstacle within the area of operations
is the Rach Ba Dap Creek that flows southward across Hwy 1 (XT543177), however, it would
be an obstacle only during heavy rains which would make it untrafficable by track
vehicles.
e. Summary: Overall evaluation and accuracy of intelligence was
rated B/2 (usually reliable and probably true). The overall security of operation
FARGO was considered excellent.
9. Mission:
a. 1st Brigade, 25th Infantry Division conducts search and destroy
operations during the period 12-14 June 1966 to locate and destroy VC forces, supplies and
base camps vic PHUOC HIEP (XT555170) and to interdict VC movements in area of operation.
b. Conduct airmobile and ground assault 12 June 1966 into obj area
to encircle VC forces.
c. Conduct ROAD RUNNER operations in sector.
d. Provide wire, pickets and technical advice on installation of RF
and PD outposts in Brigade sector.
10. Concept of Operation: 1st Brigade conducts airmobile and ground operations in
assigned area with two battalions (-) during the period 12-14 June 1966. 2d Bn, 14th
Inf established blocking position in the AO as the 4th Bn, 9th Inf conducts S&D
operations in area. A Co, 2d Bn, 14th Inf is designated as brigade reaction force.
On 12 Jun 66, 2d Bn, 14th Inf moves one (1) rifle company from operation base camp
(Operation Fort Smith) over ground to establish blocking positions from coordinates
XT553155 to XT553178 to be completed by 0700 hrs. In order to block VC attempting to
move from PHUOC HIEP. One (1) rifle company will be airlifted from Cu Chi base
location to LZ 1 by 0630 hrs and will later link up with ground force to help establish
blocking positions. On order, upon completion of blocking mission, 2/14 Inf will
continue to conduct S&D operations in Fort Smith AO. 4th Bn, 9th Inf airlifted
from Cu Chi base camp lands at LZs 2, 3, and 4 and establishes blocking positions from
coordinates XT557178 to XT568170 by 0700 hrs; initiates detailed search starting at 0730
hrs East to West from LD to boundary, linking up with 2/14 Inf blocking forces NLT 1500
hrs. Upon link up continue detailed S&D mission with priority to location and
destruction of VC caches and facilities in PHUOC HIEP. On the second day of the
operation, 13 June, 4/9 Inf will continue S&D operation and civic action activities.
Wire, pickets, and technical advice on installation to RF and PD outposts will be
part of the civic action program. Plan for helilift extraction of 4/9 Inf from AO
141500 June 1966. [See Inclosure #1: Map of area of
operations]
11. Execution: 1st Bde OPORD 8-66 (Operation Fargo) was issued 101400 June 66.
Operation commenced 120430 June 66.
a. 2/14 Inf: Co C and the Recon Plt moved from the battalion base
camp location vic XT522198 (Operation Fort Smith area of operation) at 0430 hrs to
establish blocking positions along PL RED. The Cav Plt attached to the battalion
moved from the battalion base camp at 0615 hrs to secure LZ 1 (XT52156) and occupy
coordination point at XT551173. B Co was helilifted from the Cu Chi base camp and
landed on LZ 1 at 0630 hrs. At 0630 hrs, C Co and the Recon Plt arrived at
coordinates XT548167 on PL RED and immediately established blocking positions from this
point to the coordination point at XT55178. B Co linked up with the 3/4 Cav Plt
after landing and established blocking positions from XT55155 to XT548167 along PL RED.
All blocking positions were maintained without incident until 4/9 Inf completed
it's S&D mission in the area of PL RED. At 1400 hrs all elements of 2/14 Inf
withdrew from blocking positions and continued Operation Fort Smith.
b. 4/9 Inf: At 0630 hrs the battalion departed from base camp Cu Chi
by helicopter for the operational area of Operation Fargo. The first element lifted,
A Co, landed at LZ 2 and established contact with 2/14th Inf. One (1) VCS was
detained at XT564180 who stated that VC elements, size unknown, were moving south from LZ
2. Co C & B landed at LZ 3 and 4 respectively, crossed LD at 0725 hrs and
commenced S&D operations. B Co detained 16 civilians and later released them
after interrogation. Elements of both companies discovered and destroyed 1 ton of
rice in vic XT557166. As the S&D operation continued B Co apprehended three VCS
and 1 draft dodger. Upon interrogation, one of the was determined to be a VCC.
At 1620 hrs the battalion closed on Obj 2 and established a base camp.
Resupply was effected immediately. A Co located and destroyed 1 anti-tank mine vic
XT553177 at 1645 hrs. Ambush patrols were sent out during the night at locations
XT545277, XT548172, and XT554177. Patrols had negative VC contact and returned to
base camp at 0600 hrs.
13 June 1966
4/9 Inf: At 0900 hrs, C Co, while conducting a S&D operation
encountered sniper fire at coord XT655178. Fire was eliminated as a result of
friendly small arms fire. 100 rounds of ammunition marked 188 with large star figure
were located and destroyed in vic of sniper fire. The rounds were 127 cal and were
assumed to be used for anti-aircraft purposes. At 1000 hrs 25 persons were
apprehended at XT555192. All persons were questioned by the National Police element
attached to the battalion. The interrogation resulted in one of the 25 being held
for further questioning by MP authorities. B Co at 0900 hrs located and destroyed 1
booby trapped grenade, 1 tunnel, and 9 houses at coord XT548183 during it's S&D
operation. At 1050 hrs, generally at the same coordinated, the company was hit by
heavy sniper fire and sustained 2 WIAs. Fire was immediately returned by the company
to establish a superiority of fire resulting in one (1) VC Killed (BC), 1 VC captured.
At 1420 hrs the battalion conducted a MEDCAP mission in the village of An Due at
coord XT536180 and treated 29 individuals. The engineer element attached to the
battalion completed a triple strand concertina fence around the PD compound located at
XT540276. The last VC engagement took place at 1700 hrs as C Co encountered 2 VC at
coord XT553177, which resulted in 1 VC killed (poss). By 1800 hrs all battalion
elements had returned to the operational base camp area. Ambush patrols were located
at coord XT548185, 549192, 55182, and 559178. All patrols returned by 0600 hrs the
following morning. Patrols had negative VC contact.
14 June 1966
4/9 Inf: A Co with the Cav Plt departed the operational base
camp at 0730 hrs to investigate a road block on Hwy 1 at XT603140 as reported by a
captured VC. The company, enroute, encountered several booby traps and apprehended
two VCS in vic XT612163. By 1030 hrs, the road was cleared. The road block
consisted of 16 dirt mounds, ranging from 6" to 18" high that covered the entire
width of the road. A Co then moved from the highway to a rich cache location pointed
out by the same VC the previous day. At this location, coord XT621159, the company
uncovered and destroyed 500 lbs of loose rice located in a 5'X4' hole. Extraction of
the battalion commenced at 0800 hrs with B Co helilifted from base area to Cu Chi closing
at 0842 hrs. C Co began heliborne extraction at 1300 hrs and completed closing at Cu
Chi by 1325 hrs. Prior to extraction, C Co conducted two (2) plt sized S&D
operations that commenced at 0615 hrs. At 1005 hrs the company destroyed 1 booby
trapped 105mm round in vic XT565184. A Co, after completion of it's mission of
clearing road blocks along Hwy 1, moved by road convoy and closed Cu Chi base camp 1515
hrs terminating Operation Fargo.
12. Results:
a. Personnel losses:
(1) Friendly.
4th Bn, 9th Inf: 3 WIA
(2) Enemy.
VC (BC) VC
(poss) VCC VCS
------- ---------
--- ---
1
1
1 35
b. Enemy Losses.
(1) Captured 2 tons rice.
(2) Destroyed.
(a) AT Mine: 1
(b) Booby trapped grenade:
1
(c) Tunnel complex: 1
(d) Houses: 9
(e) 188 Ammunition: 100
rds
(f) 105 How.
booby-trapped: 1
(g) Road block
6"x8": 16
(h) Loose rice: 500 lbs
13. Administrative Matters:
a. Supply.
(1) Resupply was accomplished by UH1Ds and road
convoy.
(2) 77 UH1D sorties were flown totaling
approximately 48 tons.
(3) Due to the fact that the 4th Bn, 9th Inf
established a battalion trains area and fed a modified A ration the amount of Class I and
water needed accounted for 60% of resupply effort.
b. Maintenance. No significant problems were encountered.
c. Treatment of Casualties. Evacuation by dust-off helicopter
was successful.
d. Transportation. A reduced headquarters and trains element
moved by convoy and rifle companies were helilifted with no significant problems.
e. Communications. New radios were issued prior to the
operation and effective communications were maintained.
14. Commander's Analysis: The overall results of this operation in conjunction with
Operation Fort Smith has certainly won friends for the United States in this area.
During the operation on 13 June the 4th Bn, 9th Inf conducted a MEDCAP II in the vic AP
MAY DUC at which 29 patients were treated. Due to limited time period for this
operation there were no discernable results of the one civic action activity. But
taken with CA operations in the Operation Fort Smith which was conducted in approximately
the same area it can safely be assumed that it contributed to the overall success of the
mission. The 4/9 Inf distributed about 20.000 assorted leaflets, to include Safe
Conduct Passes; Chieu Hoi (Open Arms); and 969 Reward leaflets throughout the Bn
TAOR. These leaflets were delivered mostly by hand and the effects of this
distribution cannot be determined due to the shortness of the operation. It is felt
that this distribution assisted the overall operation.
FOR THE COMMANDER:
1 Incl
JIMMIE B. SPIVEY
Overlay to OPORD 8-66
Captain, Infantry
Adjutant
